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Abstract
We study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where the state is a controlled reflecting
diffusion in the nonnegative orthant. Under certain conditions, we establish the existence of Nash
equilibria in stationary strategies for both discounted and average payoff criteria.
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1. Introduction
This paper is a sequel to [8]. In [8] we have studied a zero-sum stochastic differ-
ential game in the orthant. Here we study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game
where the state equation is governed by a controlled stochastic differential equation in
the nonnegative orthant with reflecting boundary conditions. Such processes arise in the
communication networks with heavy traffic [8,22]. Under certain conditions, we establish
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M.K. Ghosh, K.S. Kumar / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 305 (2005) 158–174 159the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. In a (two person) game (dy-
namic or static), a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies such that unilateral deviation
from this pair of strategies by any player is disadvantageous to him. Since the game is non-
cooperative, no player would deviate from a Nash equilibrium. If the first player announces
his strategy in advance then the second player would obviously maximize his own payoff.
Any strategy of the second player that maximizes his payoff is called his optimal response
corresponding to the announced strategy of the first player. There may be several optimal
responses of the second player corresponding to a particular (announced) strategy of the
first player. Similarly, one can define the optimal response of the first player. Thus for a pair
of strategies of the two players, there exists a set of pair optimal responses of the players.
This defines a multi-valued map from the set of strategies of the players to the power set
of the set of strategies. Clearly, any fixed point of this multi-valued map is a Nash equilib-
rium. To establish existence of a fixed point of this multi-valued map, we need to define a
suitable topology on the set of strategies of the players. Then under certain compactness
and convexity together with the upper semicontinuity of this multi-valued map, we can
show the existence of a fixed point [5]. In a typical game problem, the proof of the upper
semicontinuity of this multi-valued map is by far the most difficult task. The task becomes
relatively simpler if the topology on the set of strategies is metrizable. In [4] the authors
use a metrizable topology on the space of strategies for the stochastic differential game
problem for diffusion process on Rd . They establish the upper semicontinuity under cer-
tain separability conditions on the drift vector and the payoff function. These separability
conditions are typical in stochastic dynamic games in discrete time with general (uncount-
able) state space as well. In stochastic dynamic games in discrete times with uncountable
state space, these type of conditions are referred to as AR–AT which stands for additive
reward–additive transition structure; see [9,12,17,18,20]. See also the book by Filar and
Vrieze [6] and the references therein. To our knowledge, the problem of establishing the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies for discrete time stochastic game in
general state space is still open. The same holds for stochastic differential games as well.
In discrete time case, some progress has been made in this direction which merits mention
here. In [21] the authors have established the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary
strategies without AR–AT structure, but under the assumption that the transition is state in-
dependent. In [16] the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium is established, whereas
in [19] the existence of a correlated equilibrium in stationary strategies is established. Both
these results have been established without the AR–AT structure.
Coming back to stochastic differential games with controlled diffusions, if both play-
ers employ stationary strategies denoted by (v1, v2) then the corresponding state process
denoted by X(t) is a Markov process. The treatment of [4] is essentially based on estab-
lishing the continuity of the map (v1, v2) to the law of the corresponding process X(t).
This is achieved by using certain estimates on the transition density of the process X(t).
In [7] the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies is established where the
state process is a controlled reflecting diffusion in a smooth bounded domain. When the
domain is smooth and bounded, the state process X(t) under a pair of stationary strategies
has a smooth transition density. Thus the methodology of [4] can be (and has been) used
in [7]. To establish the existence of a smooth density for the reflecting diffusions satisfying
Aronson’s estimates (see [7, (3.4)]) in the orthant would be technically involved since the
160 M.K. Ghosh, K.S. Kumar / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 305 (2005) 158–174domain is non-smooth. In this paper we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
stationary strategies by proving the continuity of the map (v1, v2) to the payoff function(s)
of the players, thus avoiding a possibly more technical method involving densities of the
state process. Thus our treatment in this paper is new and different from the treatment in
[4,7].
The analysis of zero-sum differential games differs substantially from its counterpart
for nonzero-sum differential games. The zero-sum case is studied via the corresponding
Isaacs equation. If the Isaacs equation has a unique smooth solution then the value of the
zero-sum differential exists, and then one obtains saddle point strategies via the maximiz-
ing/minimizing selectors of a certain Hamiltonian associated with the Isaacs equation. For
a stochastic differential game, one can obtain these results without assuming any separabil-
ity conditions on the drift and the payoff functions [4,8]. But the analysis of nonzero-sum
game is substantially more involved. As we have explained above, the existence of a Nash
equilibrium is obtained via a fixed point theorem which involves much deeper analysis.
In [8] the existence of a saddle point equilibrium has been established for a zero-sum
stochastic differential game where the state is given by a controlled reflecting diffusion in
the orthant. For this case, the Isaacs equation is a nonlinear second-order partial differential
equation with oblique boundary condition on the boundary of the orthant. In [8] we have
established a smooth solution to this equation, and thus we have achieved our desired
results for the zero-sum case. It is explained in [8] that controlled reflecting diffusions
in the orthant arise in problems involving communications network with heavy traffic.
In a typical communication network, there are several users. Each user tries to optimize
a certain performance measure related to his traffic parameters, e.g. minimizing delays,
maximizing throughput, minimizing blocking probabilities, etc. Thus in a communication
network with heavy traffic, the basic problem is a nonzero-sum differential game with
reflecting diffusion in the orthant. But Nash equilibria is generally quite involved both
theoretically and computationally. If each user (referred to as a player) considers the rest
of the users as a single super-player and then tries to find a minimax equilibrium, then
the player can find an “optimal" strategy against the worst-case scenario, i.e, the aim of
each player is to guarantee the best performance under the worst-case behavior of the
super-player. In [8] this has been done for the network problem. In this paper we study the
nonzero-sum differential game in the orthant which is interesting in its own right. At the
same time, it has potential application in communication networks with heavy traffic as has
been explained in details in [8]. We also give an example of a linear–quadratic problem in
the orthant where a Nash equilibrium can be explicitly computed.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a technical description of the
problem. The existence of Nash equilibrium for discounted payoff criterion is treated in
Section 3. Section 4 deals with the analogous results for the average payoff criterion. We
conclude the paper in Section 5 with a few remarks.
2. Problem description
Let Ui , i = 1,2, be compact metric spaces, and let Vi = P(Ui), i = 1,2, denote the
space of probability measures on Ui endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
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D = {x ∈Rd | xi > 0, i = 1,2, . . . , d}
and let D denote the closure of D. Let
bi :D ×Ui →Rd , i = 1,2, σ :D →Rd×d, and γ :Rd →Rd .
Set
bi(x, vi) =
∫
Ui
bi(x,ui)vi(dui), x ∈ D, vi ∈ Vi, i = 1,2.
The evolution of the state X(t) of the stochastic differential game is assumed to be the
solution of the following controlled reflecting stochastic differential equations:
dX(t) = (b1(X(t), v1(t))+ b2(X(t), v2(t)))dt + σ(X(t)) dW(t)
− γ (X(t))dξ(t),
dξ(t) = I {X(t) ∈ ∂D}dξ(t), t > 0,
X(0) = x ∈ D, ξ(0) = 0,
(2.1)
where W(t) is a standard Wiener process on Rd and vi(t) is a Vi -valued process which is
progressively measurable with respect to FXt , the σ -field generated by X(t), i.e., for each
s > 0, vi(·) is measurable with respect to the σ -field B[0, s] × FXs , where B[0, s] is the
Borel σ -field on [0, s]. The process vi(t) is called an admissible strategy for player i = 1,2.
An admissible strategy vi of player i is said to be non-randomized if it is Ui -valued.
We make the following assumptions:
(A1) (i) The function bi , i = 1,2, is bounded, continuous and Lipschitz continuous in
the first argument uniformly with respect to the second.
(ii) The function σ is bounded and Lipschitz continuous.
(iii) The function a := σσ ′ is uniformly elliptic, i.e., there exists δ0 > 0 such that
x′ax  δ0‖x‖2, x ∈ D.
Besides these usual assumptions on the coefficients of (2.1), we need some assumption(s)
on γ as well. This would be required as the domain D is non-smooth. The existence of a
solution to (2.1) is achieved in three steps:
(i) Approximate D by appropriate smooth domains,
(ii) Establish the existence of a solution to (2.1) for these smooth domains.
(iii) Use convergence arguments to obtain a solution of (2.1) in D.
We use the following smooth domains. For i = 1,2, . . . , d , m 1, define:
Cim =
{
x ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ ∥∥∥∥(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xd)−( 1m, 1m, . . . , 1m
)∥∥∥∥< 1m,
1
}m
 xi < ∞
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C0m =
{
x ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ ∥∥∥∥(x1, x2, . . . , xd)−( 1m, 1m, . . . , 1m
)∥∥∥∥< 1m
}
.
Set
Iim =
{
x ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ 0 xj  1m, j = i, i, j = 1, . . . , d, 0 xj < ∞
}
,
I0m =
{
x ∈ D
∣∣∣∣ 0 xj  1m, j = 1, . . . , d
}
.
Define
Dim = (D\Iim)∪Cim, i  0, and Dm =
d⋃
i=0
Dim.
Clearly,
D =
∞⋃
m=1
Dm.
We assume that
(A2) The function γ :Rd →Rd is C2 and there exists δ1 > 0 such that
γ (x) · nm(x) δ1 for all x ∈ ∂Dm,
here nm(x) denotes the outward normal to ∂Dm.
(A3) There exists a symmetric matrix-valued map M :Rd → Rd×d such that M = (mij ),
mij ∈ Cb(Rd)∩W 2,∞(Rd) and satisfy
(i) there exists δ2 > 0 such that
x′Mx  δ2‖x‖2, x ∈Rd;
(ii) there exists C0  0 such that
C0‖x − x′‖2 +
d∑
i,j=1
mij (x)(xi − x′i )γj (x) 0 for all x ∈ ∂D, x′ ∈ D;
(iii) let z ∈ D; if for some C0  0,
C0‖x − x′‖2 +
d∑
i,j=1
mij (x)(xi − x′i )zj (x) 0 for all x ∈ ∂D, x′ ∈ D,
then z = θγ (x), for some θ  0.
For a detailed description of conditions (A2) and (A3), see [15]. Under the assumptions
(A1)–(A3), the SDE (2.1) has a unique weak solution, see [8,15].
We now describe the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with dynamics described
above. For the sake of notational simplicity, we study a two-player game, but our results
are easily generalized to N -player game.
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the ith player, i = 1,2, i.e., when the state of the system is x ∈ D and player i chooses
his action ui , i = 1,2, then the player i receives a payoff ri1(x,u1) + ri2(x,u2). Hence
both players try to maximize their payoffs through their actions. We make the following
assumption on the payoff functions:
(A4) The function rik , i, k = 1,2 is bounded, continuous and Lipschitz continuous in its
first argument uniformly with respect to the second.
Set
rik(x, vk) =
∫
Uk
rik(x,uk)vk(duk), x ∈ D, vk ∈ Vk, k, i = 1,2.
Let Ai , i = 1,2, denote the set of all admissible strategies for player i.
An admissible strategy vi , i = 1,2, is said to be a Markov strategy if there exists a
measurable function vi :R × D → Vi such that vi(t) = vi(t,X(t)), where X(t) is given
by (2.1) corresponding to (v1, v2). A Markov strategy vi is said to be stationary strategy
if vi has no explicit time dependence. By an abuse of terminology, the maps vi , i = 1,2,
themselves are referred to as Markov/stationary strategies.
Let Mi , i = 1,2, denote the set of all stationary strategies for player i.
We consider two types of payoff criteria: discounted payoff and average payoff.
2.1. Discounted payoff
Let α > 0 be the discount factor. The α-discounted payoff to player i, for the initial
condition x ∈ D and for the pair of admissible strategies (v1, v2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is given by
Riα[v1, v2](x) := E
[ ∞∫
0
e−αt
[
ri1
(
X(t), v1(t)
)+ ri2(X(t), v2(t))]dt
]
, (2.2)
where X(t) satisfies (2.1).
A pair of strategies (v∗1 , v∗2) ∈ A1 × A2 is said to be an α-discounted Nash equilibrium
for the initial condition x if
R1α
[
v∗1 , v∗2
]
(x)R1α
[
v1, v
∗
2
]
(x) for any v1 ∈ A1 and
R2α
[
v∗1 , v∗2
]
(x)R2α
[
v∗1 , v2
]
(x) for any v2 ∈ A2.
A pair of stationary strategies (the measurable maps) (v∗1 , v∗2) ∈ M1 × M2 is said to be an
α-discounted Nash equilibrium if it is a pair of α-discounted Nash equilibria for any initial
condition x.
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The (long-run) average payoff for player i, i = 1,2, for the initial conditions x ∈ D and
(v1, v2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is given by
Li[v1, v2](x) := lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[ T∫
0
[
ri1
(
X(t), v1(t)
)+ ri2(X(t), v2(t))]dt
]
. (2.3)
The definition of an average Nash equilibrium is analogous.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium is usually established by using a fixed point theo-
rem. To this end, we need to topologize Mi suitably. Here we use the L2weak∗-topology
on Mi , i = 1,2, as in [3, Chapter 2]. The space endowed with this topology is com-
pact and metrizable. Further, the topology on Mi can be characterized as follows, see
[3, Chapter 2 ].
Theorem 2.1. Let f ∈ L2(D), g ∈ Cb(D ×Ui), and vn → v in Mi , i = 1,2. Then∫
D
f (x)
∫
Ui
g(x,ui)vn(x)(dui) dx →
∫
D
f (x)
∫
Ui
g(x,ui)v(x)(dui) dx. (2.4)
Conversely, if (2.4) holds for all such f,g, then vn → v in Mi , i = 1,2.
We use the following notation. For (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2, define the elliptic operator
Lv1,v2 = 1
2
∑
ij
aij (x)
∂
∂xi∂xj
+
∑
i
(
b1i (x, v1)+ b2i (x, v2)
) ∂
∂xi
.
In what follows, we use the standard notation for Sobolev spaces, see [13] for details on
these spaces.
3. Discounted payoff criterion
In this section we establish the existence of a pair of stationary strategies which is α-
discounted Nash equilibrium.
Let (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2. Then by closely mimicking the arguments in [4], we have
sup
v1∈A1
R1α[v1, v2](x) = sup
v1∈M1
R1α[v1, v2](x) := R˜1α[v2](x), x ∈ D, and
sup
v2∈A2
R2α[v1, v2](x) = sup
v2∈M2
R2α[v1, v2](x) := R˜2α[v1](x), x ∈ D.
The above shows that if one player uses a stationary strategy then the other player can
also use a stationary strategy without any risk. Thus both players can look for finding
α-discounted Nash equilibria in stationary strategies. Also note that if player 2 uses a
fixed strategy v2 ∈ M2, then it becomes a stochastic optimal control problem for player 1,
and in this case the function R˜1α(·) is the corresponding α-discounted value function. If
M.K. Ghosh, K.S. Kumar / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 305 (2005) 158–174 165R˜1α(·) = R1α(v∗1 , v2)(·) for some v∗1 ∈ M1, then the strategy v∗1 is an optimal response of
player 1 in case player 2 is using the strategy v2. An analogous statement can be made
for R˜2α(·).
Theorem 3.1. Assume (A1)–(A4). For x ∈ D, the map (v1, v2) → Riα[v1, v2](x), i = 1,2,
from M1 ×M2 to R is continuous.
Proof. In view of the results in [2, pp. 77–80], it suffices to establish the result under the
following co-normal boundary condition:
γ (x) = nA(x) =
(∑
i
ai1(x)ni(x), . . . ,
∑
i
aid(x)nd(x)
)
, x ∈ ∂D,
where n(x) = (n1(x), . . . , nd(x)) is the unit outward normal to ∂D at x. Fix the initial
condition x ∈ D. Let (vn1 , vn2 ) → (v∞1 , v∞2 ) in M1 ×M2. Let Xn(t), n = 1,2, . . . ,∞, be the
process (2.1) corresponding to (vn1 , vn2 ), n = 1,2, . . . ,∞, and the initial condition x ∈ D.
Using the arguments in [8], we can show that φn = R1α[vn1 , vn2 ], n = 1,2, . . . ,∞, is
the unique solution in W 2p,loc(D) ∩ L∞(D), p  2, of the following partial differential
equation (PDE):{
αφn = Lvn1 ,vn2 φn + r11
(
x, vn1 (x)
)+ r12(x, vn2 (x)) in D
∇φn · nA = 0 on ∂D.
(3.1)
Let D˜l , l = 1,2, . . . , be an increasing sequence of bounded C2 domains such that D =⋃∞
l=1 D˜l , ∂D = ∂D ∩
⋃∞
l=1 ∂D˜l . Now, using [14, (6.8), p. 162 ], we can see that φn ∈
H 1(D˜l) and
|∇φn|2,D˜l  Cl, n 1,
where Cl depends only on the bounds of σ,b1, b2, r11, r12, and l. Since φn is uniformly
bounded on D˜l , l  1, we can show that
‖φn‖1,2,D˜l Cl, (3.2)
where Cl depends only on the bounds of σ , bi , r1i , and l. Using the regularity arguments
in [10, Theorem 8.8, pp. 173–175], we can show that φn ∈ H 2loc(D) and
‖φn‖2,2,Q  C, (3.3)
where Q is a compact subset of D and C is a constant which is independent of n. For each
bounded open convex set O ⊆ D˜l such that O ⊆ D˜l , we have φn ∈ H 2(O). Hence, using
[14, (8.22), p. 179] and (3.2), we obtain∫
O
d∑
i,j=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂2φn∂xi ∂xj
∣∣∣∣2  1δ02
∫
O
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i,j=1
aij
∂2φn
∂xi ∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 Cl,
where Cl depends only on the bounds of σ,b1, b2, r11, r12, l and δ0, and is independent
of O . Hence we have φn ∈ H 2(D˜l), l  1, and‖φn‖2,2,D˜l Cl (3.4)
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Sobolev imbedding theorem, and a bootstrap argument, we can show that φn ∈ W 2,ploc (D),
p  2, and
‖φn‖2,p,Q C (3.5)
where Q is a compact subset of D and C is independent of Q.
From (3.4), (3.5), Banach–Alaoglu theorem, and Sobolev imbedding theorem (see [13,
p. 78]), there exists φ ∈ W 2p,loc(D)∩H 2(D˜l), l  1, and a subsequence of φn (denoted by
φn itself without any loss of generality) satisfying
φn → φ weakly in H 2(D˜l), l  1, φn → φ in W 2,ploc (D). (3.6)
For ψ ∈D(D), it follows from (3.6) that∫
D
aij (x)
∂2φn
∂xi ∂xj
ψ →
∫
D
aij (x)
∂2φ
∂xi ∂xj
ψ. (3.7)
By Theorem 2.1, we have for k = 1,2, . . . , d :∫
Uj
bjk(x,uj )v
n
j (x)(duj ) →
∫
Uj
bjk(x,uj )v
∞
j (x)(duj ) weakly in L
2(D), j = 1,2.
Using this along with (3.6), we have for i = 1,2, . . . , d :∫
D
(
b1i
(
x, vn1 (x)
)+ b2i(x, vn2 (x)))∂φn∂xi ψ
→
∫
D
(
b1i
(
x, v∞1 (x)
)+ b2i(x, v∞2 (x))) ∂φ∂xi ψ. (3.8)
By similar arguments, we can show that∫
D
(
r11
(
x, vn1 (x)
)+ r12(x, vn2 (x)))ψ → ∫
D
(
r11
(
x, v∞1 (x)
)+ r12(x, v∞2 (x)))ψ. (3.9)
Let n → ∞ in (3.1). In view of (3.7)–(3.9), φ ∈ W 2,ploc (D) ∩ H 2(D˜l), l  1, satisfies the
PDE
αφ = Lv∞1 ,v∞2 φ + r11
(
x, v∞1 (x)
)+ r12(x, v∞2 (x)) in D
in the sense of distribution. Now using [11, Theorem 1.6.1.3, p. 63] for each D˜l , we can
see that
∂φ
∂nA
∈ H 1/2(∂D˜l) and ∂φn
∂nA
→ ∂φ
∂nA
in H−1/2
(
∂D˜l
)
.
Since
∂φn ∂φ∂nA
= 0 on ∂D˜l, we have
∂nA
= 0 on ∂D˜l .
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αφ = Lv∞1 ,v∞2 φ + r11
(
x, v∞1 (x)
)+ r12(x, v∞2 (x)) in D, ∂φ∂nA = 0 on ∂D.
Also note that φ ∈ L∞(D), since {φn} is uniformly bounded. Now, by a standard appli-
cation of Ito’s formula, we have φ(x) = R1α[v∞1 , v∞2 ](x), x ∈ D, is the unique solution of
the above PDE in the class of functions belonging to W 2,ploc (D)∩H 2(D˜l)∩L∞(D), l  1.
Thus we have shown that any limit point of φn is the solution of the above PDE . Since the
above PDE has the unique solution in the class of functions mentioned above, the limit of
φn exists. Hence the continuity of the map (v1, v2) → R1α[v1, v2](x), x ∈ D, follows. 
Lemma 3.1. Assume (A1)–(A4). For v2 ∈ M2, the function R˜1α[v2](·) is the unique solution
in W 2,ploc (D)∩L∞(D)∩H 2(D˜l), l  1, of
αφ(x) = sup
v1∈V1
[
Lv1,v2(x)φ(x)+ r11(x, v1)+ r12
(
x, v2(x)
)]
in D,
∂φ
∂γ
= 0 on ∂D.
(3.10)
A strategy v∗1 ∈ M1 is an optimal α-discounted response for the first player in case the
second player is using v2 ∈ M2 if and only if∑
i
[
b1i
(
x, v∗1(x)
)+ b2i(x, v2(x))] ∂
∂xi
R˜1α[v2](x)+ r11
(
x, v∗1(x)
)+ r12(x, v2(x))
= sup
v1∈V1
[∑
i
[
b1i (x, v1)+ b2i
(
x, v2(x)
)] ∂
∂xi
R˜1α[v2](x)+ r11(x, v1)
+ r12
(
x, v2(x)
)]
a.e.
An analogous statement holds for player 2.
Proof. Consider the PDE (3.10). Let φm ∈ H 2(Dm)∩C(Dm) be the solution to
αφm(x) = sup
v1∈V1
[
Lv1,v2(x)φm(x)+ r11(x, v1)+ r12
(
x, v2(x)
)]
in D,
∂φm
∂γ
= 0 on ∂Dm,
(3.11)
where Dm is defined in Section 1. For D˜l ⊆ Dm, from [14, pp. 465–476], we can show that
|∇φm|2,D˜l  Cl,
where Cl is independent of Dm. Since φm is uniformly bounded on D˜l , for l sufficiently
large, we have‖φm‖1,2,D˜l  Cl. (3.12)
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hence using of [14, (8.22), p. 179] and (3.12), we have∫
O
d∑
i,j=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂2φn∂xi ∂xj
∣∣∣∣2  1δ02
∫
O
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i,j=1
aij
∂2φn
∂xi ∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 Cl,
where Cl is independent of m and O .
Hence, φm ∈ H 2(D˜l), for l sufficiently large and
‖φm‖2,2,D˜l  Cl,
where Cl is independent of m. Using Banach–Alaoglu and Rellich–Kondrachov Theorems,
see [13, p. 84], there exists φ ∈ H 2(D˜l), l  1, such that
φm → φ weakly in H 2(D˜l), l  1, and φm → φ in H 1(D˜l), l  1.
Now, using the approximation arguments as in Theorem 3.1, we have that φ ∈ H 2(D˜l),
l  1, solves (3.10) in the sense of distribution.
Using the trace theorem [11, pp. 63–64], we have
∂φm
∂γ
,
∂φ
∂γ
∈ H 1/2(∂D˜l), l  1, and ∂φm
∂γ
→ ∂φ
∂γ
in H 1/2
(
∂D˜l
)
.
Hence
∂φ
∂γ
= 0 in H 1/2(∂D˜l), l  1.
Hence φ ∈ H 2(D˜l), l  1, is a strong solution of (3.10). Moreover, since {φm} is uniformly
bounded, we have φ ∈ L∞(D). Now by a standard application of Ito’s formula, we have
the following:
if φ ∈ H 2loc(D)∩H 2(D˜l)∩L∞(D), l  1, is a solution of (3.10), then φ = R˜1α[v1].
Using arguments similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we can show that the
solution belongs to W 2,ploc (D), p  2. Thus R˜1α[v1] ∈ W 2,ploc (D)∩L∞(D)∩H 2(D˜l), l  1,
is the unique solution to (3.10). The proof of the characterization of the optimal response
follows as in [7]. 
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1)–(A4). Then there exists an α-discounted Nash equilibrium in
stationary strategies.
Proof. We use a standard method which involves an application of Fan’s fixed-point theo-
rem [5].
Fix x ∈ D. For (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2, (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2, set
F1
(
x, v1, v2(x)
)= d∑
i=1
[
b1i (x, v1)+ b2i
(
x, v2(x)
)] ∂
∂xi
R˜1α[v2](x)( )+ r11(x, v1)+ r12 x, v2(x) ,
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(
x, v1(x), v2
)= d∑
i=1
[
b1i
(
x, v1(x)
)+ b2i (x, v2)] ∂
∂xi
R˜2α[v1](x)
+ r21
(
x, v1(x)
)+ r22(x, v2),
and
G1[v2] =
{
v∗1 ∈ M1
∣∣ F1(x, v∗1(x), v2(x))= sup
v1∈V1
F1
(
x, v1, v2(x)
)
a.e.
}
,
G2[v1] =
{
v∗2 ∈ M2
∣∣ F2(x, v1(x), v∗2(x))= sup
v2∈V2
F2
(
x, v1(x), v2
)
a.e.
}
.
Using a measurable selection theorem [1], it is clear that G1[v2] is nonempty. Also it is
easy to see that G1[v2] is convex. By a straightforward application of Theorem 2.1, we can
show that G1[v2] is closed in M1 and hence compact. Similarly, G2[v1] is also a nonempty,
convex, compact subset of M2. Set
G[v1, v2] = G1[v2] ×G2[v1], (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2.
Then clearly G[v1, v2] is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of M1 ×M2.
Consider the map (v1, v2) → G[v1, v2] from M1 × M2 to 2M1×M2 . Note that any fixed
point of the above set-valued map is a Nash equilibrium. In view of Fan’s fixed-point
theorem [5], it remains to prove that the map is upper semi-continuous.
Let (vn1 , v
n
2 ) → (v∞1 , v∞2 ) in M1 ×M2. Choose vn1 ∈ G1[vn2 ], n = 1,2, . . . . Since M1 is
compact, along a subsequence (denoted by the same notation without any loss of general-
ity), vn1 → v∞1 ∈ M1 for some v∞1 ∈ M1. Then (vn1, vn2 ) → (v∞1 , v∞2 ) in M1 × M2. Using
[14, pp. 465–476], as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we can show that∥∥R˜1α[vn2 ]∥∥2,2,D˜l  Cl,
where Cl is independent of n. Now, by an application of Rellich–Kondrachov imbedding
theorem (see [13, p. 84]), we have along a subsequence (denoted by the same notation
again):
R˜1α
[
vn1
]→ R˜1α[v∞1 ] in H 1(D˜l), l  1.
Now, using the topology on M1 ×M2, we can show that
F1
(
x, vn1(x), v
n
2 (x)
)→ F1(x, v∞1 (x), v∞2 (x)) weakly in L2(D˜l), l  1.
Hence a sequence of the convex combination of F1(x, vn1(x), v
n
2 (x)) converges a.e. to
F1(x, v
∞
1 (x), v
∞
2 (x)) in D.
Now for v1 ∈ M1, as it is shown above, a sequence of the convex combination of
F1(x, v1(x), v
n
2 (x)) converges a.e. to F1(x, v1(x), v
∞
2 (x)). Now from the definition of
G1[vn2 ], we have
F1
(
x, vn1(x), v
n
2 (x)
)
 F1
(
x, v1(x), v
n
2 (x)
)
a.e., n = 1,2, . . . .
Now by taking the convex combination and letting n → ∞, we have( ) ( )
F1 x, v
∞
1 (x), v
∞
2 (x)  F1 x, v1(x), v∞2 (x) a.e.
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any limit point of vn2 ∈ G2[vn1 ] belongs to G2[v∞1 ].
Thus the map is upper semi-continuous. This completes the proof. 
Example 3.1. We work out an example in the nonnegative quadrant where we can explicitly
compute a pair of non-randomized stationary strategies which is a Nash equilibrium. To
this end, we consider the following linear-quadratic problem in the nonnegative quadrant:
the state equation is given by
dX(t) = (B1u1(t)+B2u2(t))dt + dW(t)− γ dξ(t),
dξ(t) = I{X(t) ∈ ∂D}dξ(t), t > 0,
X(0) = x ∈ D, ξ(0) = 0,
(3.13)
where D is the positive quadrant, W is a standard Wiener process in R2, B1 = [1 −1]′,
B2 = [−1 1]′, γ = [1 1]′. The processes u1, u2 are scalar-valued, i.e., U1 = U2 =R. The
payoff functions are given by
R1α[u1, u2](x) := E
[ ∞∫
0
e−αt
(
u22 − u21
)
dt
]
, (3.14)
R2α[u1, u2](x) := E
[ ∞∫
0
e−αt
(
2u21 − u22
)
dt
]
. (3.15)
We look for a Nash equilibrium in linear feedback strategies, i.e., ui(t) = LiX(t), i = 1,2,
where Li is a row vector in R2. To achieve this, we consider the following coupled partial
differential equations:
αφ1(x) = 12
φ1(x)+ maxu1
[
(B1u1 +B2u2) · ∇φ1(x)− u21 + u22
]
in D,
∂φ1
∂x1
+ ∂φ1
∂x2
= 0 on ∂D,
(3.16)

αφ2(x) = 12
φ2(x)+ maxu2
[
(B1u1 +B2u2) · ∇φ2(x)+ 2u21 − u22
]
in D,
∂φ2
∂x1
+ ∂φ2
∂x2
= 0 on ∂D.
(3.17)
The linear-quadratic structure of the problem motivates us to look for quadratic solu-
tions of (3.16) and (3.17) in the form
φi(x) = pi(x1 − x2)2 + qi, i = 1,2, (3.18)
where pi, qi are scalars to be determined from (3.16) and (3.17). Substituting (3.18) into
(3.16) and (3.17) and simplifying, the maximizing linear feedback strategies are given by
u1 = 2p1(x1 − x2), u2 = −2p2(x1 − x2). (3.19)
Again substituting (3.18) and (3.19) into (3.16) and (3.17) and simplifying, we obtain the
following coupled quadratic equations:
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αp2 = 8p21 + 8p1p2 + 4p22, αq2 = 2p2. (3.21)
Using Mathematica, we find that (3.20) and (3.21) have unique non-zero solutions given
by
p1 = 0.0513924α, p2 = 0.0619571α,
q1 = 0.1027848, q2 = 0.1239142. (3.22)
Thus a Nash equilibrium in linear feedback strategies is given by (3.19), where pi, qi ,
i = 1,2, are given in (3.22). The corresponding Nash values are given by (3.18).
Remark 3.1. It may be noted that the coupled equations (3.16), (3.17) may have multiple
solutions. Thus we may not get a unique pair of Nash equilibria. Here we have obtained
a Nash equilibrium in linear feedback strategies which is highly desirable from a practical
point of view. Also note that in Example 3.1 the Nash equilibrium is established without
the compactness of the action spaces. This is due to the quadratic structure of the cost. This
is rather common in all linear-quadratic problems.
4. Average payoff criterion
In the long-run average (ergodic) payoff structure, the asymptotic behavior of the con-
trolled diffusion plays a crucial role. To establish the stability of the process, we make the
following assumption:
(A5) There exists a symmetric positive definite matrix Q and a scalar λ > 0 such that for
all x, y ∈ D, (u1, u2) ∈ U1 ×U2,
2b(x, y,u1, u2) ·Q(x − y)− [Q(x − y)]
′a(x, y)Q(x − y)
(x − y)′Q(x − y) + trace
(
a(x, y)Q
)
−λ‖x − y‖2,
where
b(x, y,u1, u2) = b1(x,u1)− b1(y,u1)+ b2(x,u2)− b2(y,u2) and
a(x, y) = [σ(x)− σ(y)][σ(x)− σ(y)]′.
For an illustration of (A5), see [8]. The following results are proved in [8].
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1)–(A3) and (A5). For (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2, the process X(t) cor-
responding to (2.1) has a unique invariant measure denoted by η[v1, v2].
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1)–(A3) and (A5). For (v1, v2) ∈ A1 ×A2 and x ∈ Dm, let Xm(x, t)
denote the corresponding process given by (2.1) with D replaced by Dm. Then there exist
C1,C2 independent of (v1, v2) and m 1, such that∥∥ m m ∥∥ −C1tE X (x, t)−X (y, t) C2e ‖x − y‖, x, y ∈ Dm.
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Li[v1, v2](x) =
∫
D
[
ri1
(
y, v1(y)
)+ ri2(y, v2(y))]η[v1, v2] (dy) := ρi[v1, v2].
Lemma 4.3. Assume (A1)–(A5). The map (v1, v2) → ρi[v1, v2], i = 1,2, from M1 × M2
to R is continuous.
Proof. Using the arguments in [8, Theorem 4.1], we can show that for (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2,
ρi = Lv1,v2φ + ri1
(
x, v1(x)
)+ ri2(x, v2(x)) in D,
∂φ
∂γ
= 0 on ∂D (4.1)
has a unique solution in H satisfying φ(x0) = 0 for a fixed x0 ∈ D, where
H= {φ ∈ W 2,ploc (D) ∣∣ p  2, φ has linear growth}.
Moreover, ρi = ρi[v1, v2], i = 1,2.
Let (vn1 , v
n
2 ) → (v∞1 , v∞2 ) in M1 ×M2. From the above, the PDE given by
ρni = Lv
n
1 ,v
n
2 φn + ri1
(
x, vn1 (x)
)+ ri2(x, vn2 (x)) in D,
∂φn
∂γ
= 0 on ∂D (4.2)
has a unique solution in R × W 2,ploc (D), p  2, with φn(x0) = 0, and ρni = ρi[vni , vn2 ],
i = 1,2, n = 1,2, . . . ,∞. For α > 0, consider the PDE given by
αφnαi(x)+ αφ˜nαi(x) = Lv
n
1 ,v
n
2 φ˜nαi + ri1
(
x, vn1 (x)
)+ ri2(x, vn2 (x)) in D,
∂φ˜nαi
∂γ
= 0 on ∂D,
(4.3)
where φnαi is the unique solution in W
2,p
loc (D)∩L∞(D)∩H 2(D˜l), l  1, of
αφnαi(x) = Lv
n
1 ,v
n
2 φnαi + ri1
(
x, vn1 (x)
)+ ri2(x, vn2 (x)) in D,
∂φnαi
∂γ
= 0 on ∂D. (4.4)
Using the arguments as in Theorem 3.1, we can prove the following estimates:{∥∥φ˜nαi∥∥2,2,D˜l  Cl, n 1∥∥φ˜nαi∥∥2,p,E  C(E,p), n 1, p  2, E is a compact set, (4.5)
where the constants Cl and C(E,p) are independent of α and n 1.
Now, using the arguments in [3, pp. 158–162], we have
∥∥φni ∥∥2,2,D˜l Cl, n 1,∥∥φni ∥∥2,p,E  C(E,p), n 1, p  2, E is a compact set, (4.6)|ρi |C,
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unique solution to (4.2) for n = 1,2, . . . .
Using (4.6) along with the arguments in Theorem 3.1, we can show that any limit point
of (ρni , φ
n
i ) is a solution to (4.2) with n = ∞. Hence by the uniqueness of the solution to
(4.2), we have
ρi
[
vn1 , v
n
2
]→ ρi[v∞1 , v∞2 ]. 
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1)–(A5). Let v2 ∈ M2. Then
ρ = sup
v1∈V1
[
Lv1,v2φ(x)+ r11(x, v1)+ r12
(
x, v2(x)
)]
in D,
∂φ
∂γ
= 0 on ∂D
(4.7)
has a unique solution (ρ∗1 [v2], φ1[v2]) in R×W 2,ploc (D)∩H 2(D˜l), l  1, p  2, satisfying
φ1[v2](x0) = 0. Moreover, a strategy v∗1 ∈ M1 is the ergodic optimal response for player 1
in case the second player is using v2 ∈ M2 if and only if∑
i
[
b1i
(
x, v∗1(x)
)+ b2i(x, v2(x))] ∂
∂xi
φ1[v2](x)+ r11
(
x, v∗1(x)
)+ r12(x, v2(x))
= sup
v1∈V1
∑
i
[[
bi1(x, v1)+ bi2
(
x, v2(x)
)] ∂
∂xi
φ1[v2](x)+ r11(x, v1)+ r12
(
x, v2(x)
)]
.
An analogous statement holds for player 2.
Proof. The proof of the first part follows as in the proof of Lemma 4.3. The second part
follows as in [8] . 
In view of Lemma 4.3 we can prove the following result as in the discounted case. We
omit the details.
Theorem 4.2. Assume (A1)–(A5). There exists a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies
for the average payoff criterion.
5. Conclusions
We have studied a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game in the nonnegative orthant.
Under certain conditions, we have established the existence of Nash equilibria in stationary
strategies for both discounted and average payoff criteria. As we have mentioned in the
introduction, our treatment of establishing Nash equilibria differs from that used in [4,7].
The treatment in [4,7] is based on establishing the continuity of the map (v1, v2) ∈ M1×M2
to the law of the corresponding process X(t). In the present case such a treatment would
be technically more involved since the state space is not smooth. We have derived our
result by proving the continuity of the map (v1, v2) → Riα(v1, v2)(x) in Theorem 3.1. Thus
174 M.K. Ghosh, K.S. Kumar / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 305 (2005) 158–174our treatment here is new, and this may be more useful in treating similar problems in
non-smooth domains. Finally, we would like to mention that we have established a Nash
equilibrium in stationary strategies under an additive drift and an additive reward structure.
To establish the same result without this structure remains a challenging problem.
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